The PRISONER’S DILEMMA REVISITED
FEDERAL LAW No. 12.850/13 (Brazil) IN THE LIGHT OF GAME THEORY ABSTRACT
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10840046Keywords:
Colaboração premiada, Teoria dos jogosAbstract
This paper intends to highlight the pertinence and advantages arising from the application of the principles, concepts, structures and strategies studied by game theory in the legal procedu-
re of award-winning collaboration, instituted in Brazil by Law nº. 12.850/2013. The paper begins with a historical-analytical approach of the aforementioned Law, as well as the presentation of an abstract model for representing the negotiation of the award-winning collaboration betwe-
en the potential collaborators and negotiators, privileging their most relevant traits and indi-
cating important variations of this primary model, within what allows Brazilian legal system. The results achieved by the construction of these models lead to conclude that game theory is a theoretical tool able to introduce significant improvements in the analysis of the problem. It also allows better conditions for negotiators (i.e., police officers or public prosecutors) in order to make possible agreements that satisfy the expectations of law and society, that is, efficiency on disrupting gangs and on identification and punishment of criminals.